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Chapter 7 
Rank-and-File Participation in 
Organizing at Home and Abroad 
Lowell Turner 
The dramatic change of leadership at the AFL-CIO in the fall of 1995 
occurred in a context of major new efforts aimed at revitalization of the 
American labor movement. The new leaders and their majority coalition 
have promised to unleash labor's "social movement" potential by shifting 
new resources into both union organizing drives and grassroots political 
campaigns. ATtne same time, John Sweeney has offered business leadersTa 
"social compact" for economic growth and labor peace if unionism is ac-
cepted and labor given a place at the table.1 Together, these developments 
offer hopeful signs of new life for organized labor in America. 
The rebirth of a long-declining labor movement will not occur overnight, 
however. It will require patience, persistence, and a fundamental transfer^ 
mation in the attitudes and strategies of many union leaders and activists. 
Above all, this transformation requires rank-and-file participation. 
We know that we need labor law reform.2 But it is also clear that this is 
not all we need; nor can we expect to achieve legal reform simply by electing 
Democrats. That strategy did not work in 1978-79 or in 1993-94, and it 
will not work in the future. In the face of inevitably powerful and well-
organized business opposition, even the most well-financed and articulate 
lobbying campaign for labor law reform can fail. What was missing in 
1978-79 and in 1993-94 and is urgently needed now is the pressure of 
For help with the research and/or useful comments, the author thanks Lee Adler, Kate 
Bronfenbrenner, John Delaney, Chris Erickson, James Gibbs, Rick Hurd, Bruce Raynor, Witich 
Rossmann, Monica Russo, Victor Silverman, and Joe Uehlein. 
1. See, for example, Greenhouse 1995. 
2. The argument is persuasively made and well documented in Friedman et al. 1994. 
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a massive social movement, mobilized to transform and democratize the 
American workplace. 
The potential is there for such a movement, fueled by falling real wages, 
growing income polarization, and a widespread desire for expanded voice 
in the workplace (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations 1994b; Kochan 1995; Levine 1995). But 
the potential will not be realized unless people are allowed and encouraged 
to participate fully in the building of their own union organizing drives, 
union mobilization efforts, including labor-community coalitions, and 
grassroots political campaigns. 
This chapter presents case studies of success and failure in union organiz-
ing campaigns in the United States and Germany to support the cross-
national—and thus to some extent universal—validity of this argument. 
Comparative analysis is especially useful in developing and testing causal 
relationships. If, for example, rank-and-file participation can be shown 
to have similar effects in organizing efforts in contrasting institutional 
and cultural contexts, the explanatory power of the hypothesis suggested 
here may well be significant (thus meriting further and more extensive 
testing). Germany affords the context of a comparable advanced industrial 
society but one with very different traditions and institutions of industrial 
relations (such as codetermination and comprehensive collective bargain-
ing) and historically strong unions facing a parallel need for contemporary 
revitalization. 
The case studies examine parallel organizing drives, two each in the United 
States and Germany. Although four case studies do not constitute proof, these 
cases are highly suggestive concerning the impact of and potential that could 
result from expanding rank-and-file participation in union organizing and 
contract campaigns. The findings are also consistent with"sorne"bf the best 
contemporary U.S.-based research and analysis on union organizing (see, 
for example, Bronfenbrenner 1993; Johnston 1994; Hurd 1997). 
The U.S. Cases 
Tultex 
Since the late 1970s, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (ACTWU) had tried on five occasions to organize at Tultex, a large 
sweatsuit manufacturing plant in Martinsville, Virginia, that in 1994 em-
ployed twenty-three hundred employees, 55 percent of them black.3 After 
four failed attempts, persistence finally paid off in a two-to-one union certi-
3. The Tultex and DuPont case studies presented here are based on interviews conducted 
with key union organizers active in leadership roles in each campaign. 
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fication election victory in 1994, followed by the consolidation of an active 
local (UNITE Local 1994) and the negotiation of a strong first contract in 
early 1995. The key elements of this important victory were a massive flow 
of information to educate the workforce about what the union could offer 
as well as to counter management's antiunion campaign; extensive mobili-
zation of union supporters within the workforce, based on solid ground-
work laid during previous organizing campaigns; and focused and strategic 
use of union resources, including an extensive yet targeted house call cam-
paign, to win over swing voters. 
After close union election defeats in 1989 and 1990 (48 percent for the 
union in 1989 and 46 percent in 1990), ACTWU gave up on Tultex for a 
few years. Above all, rank-and-file supporters were demoralized and unwill-
ing to carry on after the failure of their major, risk-taking efforts. And the 
company showed savvy," setting up teams and joint committees to offer 
workers the promise of voice in lieu of unionization. 
After two or three years, however, in response to new cost-cutting pres-
sures, the company forgot its earlier promises and eliminated the joint com-
mittees along with pay bonuses and certain shift premiums, thus effectively 
cutting take-home pay. As anger among the workers mounted, the union 
sent in probes in April and May 1994, surveying workers to test the "heat." 
The heat was there, although the continuing demoralization of former 
workforce activists from the earlier failed campaigns was apparent. Other-
wise, conditions were ripe, and in June, the union initiated yet another 
organizing campaign. 
Given the initial demoralization of the workforce, the campaign got off 
to a slow start, and the union considered abandoning the drive in the first 
week. But after a strong core of seasoned ACTWU organizers visited the 
homes of potential rank-and-file leaders, the petition drive began to pick up 
steam. Critical to the turnaround was a major deployment of ACTWU 
resources (especially the use of fifteen to twenty union staff members experi-
enced in "reading" the potential for participation on the part of rank and 
filers), the mobilization of rank-and-file activists to get signatures and subse-
quently keep the campaign going, and expanded coverage of the organizing 
drive on local television. 
Experts from the union's Comprehensive Campaigns Department came 
in to help gain media coverage and to counter the company's antiunion 
message. A local maverick cable station began to cover the campaign, prod-
ded by the union to get the story out. The company also used the cable 
station to promote its side of the story, and soon the whole town was 
watching nightly coverage and competing prime-time ads. For the union, 
such exposure was invaluable, from talk show discussions that included 
unionized workers from a nearby towel-manufacturing plant to film clips 
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showing the construction of an expensive lakefront vacation home for a 
Tultex executive juxtaposed with the shacks of employee families facing 
company cutbacks. Through the medium of local television, the union pro-
moted an active campaign of information and~puBIicity and entered in a 
powerful way into the conscious life of the community. 
The contribution of ComprehensiveDaTripaigns^as important in keeping 
the company at bay and in enabling rank-and-file and staff organizers to 
push the organizing drive forward. For example, through the media, the 
union exposed the role of a black consulting firm from North Carolina 
hired to convince black workers to vote against the union. That checks had 
been written for black ministers in earlier campaigns was exposed on cable 
TV; and this time, the union made a major effort to win the support of 
local ministers. Company efforts to divide black and white workers were 
effectively countered. 
In the course of the petition drive and subsequent election campaign, 
union staff and rank-and-file activists conducted more than one thousand 
house calls in which they talked to workers and their families face-to-face, 
winning people over. Past experience at Tultex was a valuable guide: rather 
than the blanket house calls that the union had conducted in 1989 and 
1990, the visits were well targeted. Visits were focused neither on those 
who had signed union cards in 1989, 1990, and 1994 (and were thus 
considered safe union voters) nor on those who had never signed (and were 
thus considered likely antiunion voters) but on those who had signed once 
or twice but not all three times—swing voters. In addition, house calls were 
made to potential rank-and-file leaders and activists to get these folks to 
carry much of the workload through their own active participation. The 
strategy worked: the August 1994 NLRB election resulted in an overwhelm-
ing 1,321 to 720 union victory. 
ACTWU wasted no time in building on the victory, and by early 1995 
the new membership had ratified the first union contract at Tultex. In the 
face of solid rank-and-file support for the union, the company backed down 
quickly from its adversarial stance and agreed to a particularly strong con-
tract (from the union point of view) that granted ACTWU (now UNITE) 
representatives unparalleled access in the mill, good communication with 
management and with the workforce, and the beginnings of a largely coop-
erative labor-management relationship. And as an important spin-off of this 
successful effort, the union quickly organized another Tultex plant with six 
hundred workers, located a forty-minute drive from Martinsville. 
The ingredients in this important union victory offer important lessons 
for other organizing drives: union persistence after earlier defeats, a massive 
flow of information (including the use of local television as well as extensive 
house call visits) to support union demands and counter management oppo-
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sition, and the mobilization and participation of experienced union organiz-
ers and active rank-and-file leadership. 
DuPont 
As organizers for the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) put it 
these days: "We're coming down out of the coalfields." As the use of auto-
mation has expanded in the coal mining industry, along with alternative 
sources of energy generation, UMWA membership numbers have fallen 
dramatically with the total number of employed coal miners. Nonetheless, 
the industry has experienced continuing union commitment and activism, 
resulting in dramatic victories, such as the Pittston strike, under the most 
adverse circumstances. That prolonged, militant, and successful strike in 
particular once again catapulted the UMWA into prominence within the 
labor movement: members in their camouflage suits and with high spirits 
have been visible morale boosters at union-led demonstrations (in Washing-
ton and elsewhere), while past UMWA president Richard Trumka now 
shares governance of the AFL-CIO as secretary-treasurer on the recently 
elected Sweeney slate. In part as a spin-off of the long and spirited Pittston 
campaign, UMWA organizers have moved "down out of the coalfields" of 
Appalachia to play increasingly active roles in other organizing campaigns. 
One recent effort took place at a DuPont chemical plant in Martinsville 
that employs 550 workers. Facing growing worker dissatisfaction regarding 
pay and working conditions, a local, unaffiliated company-oriented union 
at the plant approached the UMWA regarding merger talks. Although the 
UMWA could have simply accepted the merger, UMWA officials thought it 
was important for the workers to vote their union in. The UMWA con-
ducted a card-signing campaign from July to October 1994, resulting in the 
collection of signatures by 80 percent of the workforce. Important in the 
successful petition campaign was the extensive use of house call visits, a 
new tactic for the UMWA. 
The company counterattacked, however, and highly effectively. Using the 
same cable television channel ACTWU had used during the Tultex cam-
paign, along with in-plant TV monitors, DuPont broadcast a steady stream 
of film clips showing past incidents of violence against and by strikers in 
the coalfields. Company managers told captive workforce audiences that 
this was the kind of thing they could expect in Martinsville if they voted the 
UMWA in. Many of the workers who had signed cards got scared; when 
elections were held in November 1994, the UMWA lost to a new company-
oriented union by 276 to 218 (with 36 votes for no union at all). 
The UMWA credits its strong card-signing effort and its 218 election 
votes to the more than eight hundred house calls union organizers and 
rank-and-file activists made in the course of the campaign. For the union, 
128 LOWELL TURNER 
this is clearly the way to go in future campaigns. But obviously, the house 
calls themselves were not enough. 
Why did the UMWA lose this election? First, the union did not want to 
get involved in a media/television campaign. The Tultex experience suggests 
that this was probably a mistake. Second, and most important, unlike 
ACTWU, the UMWA was a new presence in town, a relatively unknown 
quantity to most of the workforce, with no history of active participation 
in the plant; it was unable to counter DuPont's campaign on its own turf. 
When the company showed films of violence in the coalfields, workers had 
insufficiently close rapport or relations of trust with union organizers to 
believe the union side of the story. In their house calls and other cam-
paigning, UMWA organizers explained that although it had sometimes been 
necessary to use aggressive tactics in the past in the face of company vio-
lence, UMWA members were not conducting themselves in this way any-
more and the union had no intention of bringing such tactics to 
Martinsville. Although true, this argument did not carry enough weight, 
given the newness of the UMWA-workforce relationships and the intensity 
of the company's propaganda campaign. 
What is the solution? From this defeat, UMWA organizers have drawn 
the following lessons: they need to get to know the DuPont workers better, 
establish an ongoing union presence, build relationships of trust, and engage 
DuPont workers as active participants in union programs to build the rap-
port and trust necessary to neutralize the effects of antiunion management 
tactics in the future. This is exactly what the United Mine Workers have 
done in the wake of this election defeat: a UMWA local union has been 
established in Martinsville with a significant number of DuPont workers as 
members. The new local has offered benefits through the AFL-CIO union 
privileges program, provided attorneys for compensation cases, sent several 
workers from the plant to the UMWA's organizing school, and plans to 
engage in other organizing efforts in the Martinsville area. Hoping to build 
on past defeats as ACTWU did at Tultex, the UMWA aims to turn defeat 
into victory by developing trust and encouraging union participation at the 
DuPont plant, building toward the next certification opportunity in 1998, 
when the current contract expires. 
The German Cases 
In the United States, with its growing income polarization, use of aggressive 
antiunion tactics by corporations, and largely nonunion South, important 
organizing battles still need to be won in traditional manufacturing indus-
tries. By contrast, in Germany, as in much of northern Europe, manufactur-
ing industries are largely organized. Whereas union membership density in 
the United States has dropped to 15 percent in the 1990s, levels in Germany 
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remain at well over 30 percent, even in the face of job loss and declining 
union membership rolls. As employment has shifted toward service and 
white-collar occupations, German unions have maintained membership 
density not so much by organizing new workers as by deepening member-
ship levels in manufacturing industries, where they were already strong and 
are now even stronger (Armingeon 1989). There is a limit to this strategy, 
however. If German unions are to stave off the decline in numbers faced by 
British, French, and American unions, they must shift their organizing focus 
to service, white-collar, professional, and technical employees. Thus, efforts 
by contemporary German unions to do so provide a functional equivalent, 
or "contextual comparison" (Locke and Thelen 1995), for the American 
cases presented above. 
The two case studies offered below examine union organizing campaigns 
during the early 1990s at two American computer companies in Germany: 
DEC, where the metalworkers union succeeded beyond its expectations, 
and IBM, where union efforts fell short.4 
The laws, institutions, and practices of industrial relations are, of course, 
different in important ways in the United States and Germany.5 The most 
significant differences are that collective bargaining in Germany typically 
takes place on a regional/national basis for entire industry sectors, between 
industrial unions and employers associations (in contrast to union-company 
bargaining in the United States); and German firms with five or more em-
ployees are required to have elected works councils, which have legal rights 
to information, consultation, and codetermination in specified management 
decision-making processes, whereas there are no such mandated bodies or 
employee rights in the United States. In spite of these differences, the cases 
presented here are unusually comparable: at DEC, the company did not 
belong to the employers association and thus the union could negotiate only 
a company-level agreement, while at IBM the company subdivided the firm 
and pulled much of it out of the employers association so as to pursue its 
cost-cutting goals; and, in the absence of an initially strong union presence, 
the works councils at both firms functioned in many ways parallel to the 
company-oriented union discussed in the DuPont case above. 
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) 
With only a small manufacturing presence in Germany, Digital employs 
mostly white-collar and highly skilled employees. Most work in software 
4. I learned of these cases from Witich Rossmann, an IG Metall staff member involved in 
both the DEC and IBM campaigns, who wrote up these cases for a paper presented at a 
Cornell conference in October 1994. For more details on these cases as well as an analysis of 
the broader contemporary German industrial relations context, see Rossmann 1995. 
5. For comparisons of industrial relations in Germany and the United States, see Turner 
1991 and Wever 1995. 
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development, technical services, sales and distribution, and administration 
—many of the modern occupations that German unions must learn to 
organize. On the heels of a major cost-cutting and downsizing campaign in 
the early 1990s, the company offered IG Metall (the large metalworkers 
union that organizes the German auto, steel, machine-tool, shipbuilding, 
and electronics companies, including DEC and IBM) an opportunity to 
learn by doing. 
In the spring of 1992, Digital announced a wave of layoffs. The union 
responded by denouncing the company plan (the terms of which would 
have to be negotiated with the elected works council), calling instead for 
long-term business planning, no layoffs, downsizing through attrition, re-
training, transfers, reduced working time, and work sharing. IG Metall also 
launched a union membership drive (at DEC-Germany, the union member-
ship rate was less than 5 percent, including 10 percent at the main DEC 
location in Cologne) and called a first brief "warning strike" in Cologne in 
April 1992.6 
Although only 10 percent of DEC-Cologne employees belonged to the 
union, 80 percent participated in that first warning strike. Additional warn-
ing strikes and protest actions followed at Cologne and elsewhere in Ger-
many between November 1992 and the beginning of a full-fledged strike in 
June 1993. Management's continued refusal to consider union demands 
coupled with a major union organizing effort led to a rise in membership 
levels from 5 to 30 percent nationwide at DEC and from 10 percent to 
more than 50 percent at the main location in Cologne. 
When a strike vote was held in 1993, 92 percent of the union members 
at DEC participated in the vote, and 85 percent voted for strike authoriza-
tion. In typical German fashion, the strike started out small at DEC loca-
tions in Berlin, Bremen, Hannover, and Hamburg, spreading after a few 
days to the main location in Cologne. Only at the end of the first week did 
management finally agree to negotiate. The settlement that was reached 
surprisingly quickly at the end of the second week included new job security 
provisions and an agreement to follow the terms of a typical regional-level 
IG Metall contract and in general far exceeded the expectations of the DEC 
workforce. 
In poststrike discussion and analysis, IG Metall credited the organizers' 
grassroots, participatory approach for this first dramatic organizing and 
strike success in the German computer industry. An open information policy 
and effective communication structures, both before and during the strike, 
were particularly important. As IG Metall organizer Witich Rossmann put 
6. Warning strikes in the German system typically last anywhere from twenty minutes to a 
full day and are designed to demonstrate union strength in bargaining situations. 
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it: "Traditional union communication, characterized by a selective and hier-
archical information policy, is unsuitable for qualified workforces in the 
computer industry. Strategic goals must be subject to discussion and alter-
ation at all times" (1995:19). Elected white-collar works councilors (most 
of whom joined the union) participated actively in both the organizing 
campaign and the strike, cooperated closely with the union, and subjected 
their own policies to open rank-and-file discussion and votes. Finally, IG 
Metall, in a bid to modernize the union's internal structure, gave local 
organizers and activists not only support but broad autonomy to develop 
plant- and company-specific policy. 
The mobilization of participation (including information, consultation, 
and codetermination) inside the workforce and union made possible this 
first upsurge of unionization in the German computer industry. A very 
different and more traditional approach yielded a much less favorable result 
at IBM. 
IBM Deutschland 
Unlike DEC, IBM in Germany did belong to the appropriate employers 
association. Although unionization levels were low in early 1992, its thirty-
one thousand employees were nonetheless covered under the terms of col-
lective agreements. In response to market forces similar to those facing 
DEC and in a drive to achieve flexibility and cost cutting, IBM launched a 
restructuring campaign, moving large parts of the company into indepen-
dent spin-offs and out from under the umbrella of collective bargaining 
agreements. The explicit intent, articulated in 1992, was to carve out union-
free areas of the company and to replace collective agreements with separate 
plant agreements negotiated with local works councils. 
In 1992 and 1993, downsizing was accomplished through voluntary re-
tirements, thus minimizing workforce opposition. The DEC strike in 1993 
had a mobilizing effect on the IBM workforce, however, resulting in a 
campaign to raise union membership (which rose from less than 5 percent 
to 11 percent by the end of 1993 for IG Metall; a parallel rise occurred in a 
separate white-collar and competing union, DAG). 
Dual unionism proved to be a major obstacle to workforce mobilization 
at IBM. At most workplaces covered by collective agreements in the metal 
and electronics industries of Germany, IG Metall is the sole or clearly domi-
nant union. Given the history of weak unionization at IBM, however, the 
role of the alternative white-collar union—DAG, an independent union 
unaffiliated with the central labor federation, DGB—took on prominence. 
DAG was much more willing than IG Metall to sign separate plant agree-
ments, in lieu of existing industry-level collective agreements. Elected works 
councilors at IBM were divided among IG Metall and DAG members and 
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those belonging to no union. Together, DAG and nonunion works coun-
cilors formed a majority, thereby offering management negotiators a more 
conservative and company-oriented approach. 
Given these divisions on the works councils and in the workforce, no 
unified labor strategy was developed at IBM (as it had been at DEC) in 
response to company restructuring initiatives. While IG Metall demanded 
that the company adhere to the industry collective agreements (and was 
unable to develop company-specific demands), IBM pushed its plans for-
ward through negotiations with works council majorities consisting of DAG 
members and nonunionists, who together established a collective bargaining 
committee. Negotiations with the company took place in secret, with no 
mobilization or involvement of the workforce. 
In early 1994, a new company-specific collective agreement was reached 
to replace existing industry-level (IG Metall) agreements. The new agree-
ment strengthened the hand of the company in its drive toward having 
separate plant agreements and negotiating with individual employees; at the 
same time, the agreement included important workforce concessions on 
salary, bonuses, and working time (weekly working time was increased 
from thirty-six to thirty-eight hours, thus reversing at IBM IG Metall's 
largely successful campaign elsewhere in the German metal and electronics 
industries for the thirty-five-hour week). 
The story at IBM is by no means over. IG Metall continues to represent 
the company's manufacturing workers, while pushing for expanded influ-
ence and running candidates in works council elections elsewhere in the 
company. DAG claims that its broadening of collective bargaining coverage 
to new areas such as software lays the groundwork for a new and improved 
industry agreement. But the IBM workforce remains for the most part unin-
volved in these events, as, largely unorganized and participating only little 
in the operations of unions or works councils, workers pursue individual 
career paths. 
Limited workforce involvement, a restricted flow of information, and a 
top-down union approach to strategy and negotiation (on the part of both 
IG Metall, which kept to a strict and inflexible union line, and DAG, which 
held secret negotiations for a company- and concessions-oriented agree-
ment) resulted in a weak and largely ineffectual unionization campaign at 
IBM in the early 1990s. 
Conclusion: No Substitute for Participation 
The evidence presented here suggests the importance of informed, hands-on 
rank-and-file involvement in union organizing campaigns, at home and 
abroad, in a variety of institutional settings, in traditional and modern indus-
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tries alike. Broader data on both the United States (Bronfenbrenner 1993; 
Hurd 1997) and Germany (Armingeon 1989) point in the same direction. 
There is a rather extraordinary convergence among contemporary labor 
movements in various societies toward expanded participation at the work-
place and in the union. We see this today in Germany, a society whose 
comprehensive collective bargaining coverage and workforce codetermina-
tion rights have forced companies to take the "high road" (of high-wage, 
high-productivity production) but where unions are currently under pres-
sure to organize new industries as well as to hold on to past gains in an 
increasingly open and integrated market. We see it in the United States, 
where the absence of adequate institutional protection has enabled many 
companies to take the "low road" (of low-wage, union-free production) and 
new labor leaders campaign for resurgence and a new social movement 
unionism based on mass mobilization. 
To mention one more inspiring and particularly revealing example, we 
see it also in South Africa, a new democracy where strong unions have 
demanded and the African National Congress-led government is imple-
menting German-style codetermination legislation (including mandated 
company-level works councils), along with a structure of national-, re-
gional-, and local-level tripartite councils, to promote labor-inclusive rela-
tions of social partnership. As in the United States and Germany, the 
mobilization of rank-and-file participation, in the union as in the com-
munity and workplace, has become necessary both for the stabiliza-
tion of democracy in turbulent times and for the expansion of economic 
citizenship. 
Given the long-term decline of the American labor movement, it will be 
some time before labor here is ready to claim the extent of full social, 
political, and economic inclusion that South African unions are currently 
demanding in their transformational society. The key to the South African 
success lies in a history of active, social movement unionism: largely black 
unions, with more than 50 percent membership density, mobilized in the 
battle against apartheid and now in the transformation of society. Unlike 
business unionism or a servicing model of unionism, social movement 
unionism is dependent on active rank-and-file participation, a mobilization 
of involvement that, if encouraged rather than suppressed, can carry over 
into expanded union, workplace, and political democracy (Johnston 1994). 
This is true today in South Africa, as it has been in the past and can be in 
the future, in both Germany and the United States. 
The South African context is, of course, very different from that of either 
Germany or the United States. The point to be emphasized here, however, 
in cross-national comparative analysis, is that labor movement revitaliza-
tion and inclusion, based on expanded rank-and-file participation, appear 
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both appropriate and necessary in the contemporary era in a variety of 
contrasting cross-national contexts. 
Case studies of union organizing success and failure at home and abroad 
suggest that ongoing and extensive rank-and-file participation, rather than 
a faucet to be turned on and off by employers or unions, is a necessary 
ingredient for the revitalization of contemporary workplaces, communities, 
and labor movements. 
